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I.S.B. #5867
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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P.O. Box 2816
Boise, ID 83701
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
)
JEREMY COOK,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
________________________________ )

NO. 43258
CANYON COUNTY
NO. CR 2014-27455
APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jeremy Cook pled guilty to operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol, a second felony within fifteen years, and was sentenced to a unified term of ten
years, with four years fixed. He contends the district court abused its discretion by
imposing an excessive sentence in light of the mitigating factors that exist in this case.
He also contends the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion pursuant
to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 for reduction of sentence.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Cook was arrested on December 14, 2014, after driving a motorcycle while
under the influence of alcohol and allegedly attempting to elude a pursuing police
vehicle. (R., p.10.) He was charged by criminal complaint with one count of operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”), a second felony offense
within fifteen years, and one count of eluding a peace officer. (R., pp.9-11.) Mr. Cook
waived a preliminary hearing and was bound over to the district court. (R., pp.18, 19.)
The State then filed an Information charging Mr. Cook with one count of DUI and
alleging it was his second felony offense within fifteen years. (R., pp.20-21, 22-23.)
Mr. Cook pled guilty to the DUI count, and admitted it was his second felony DUI within
fifteen years. (Tr. 2/20/15, p.7, L.22 – p.9, L.23.) In exchange, the State agreed to
dismiss the eluding count and agreed not to pursue a persistent violator enhancement.
(R., pp.34, 50; Tr. 2/20/15, p.2, Ls.2-6.)
The district court sentenced Mr. Cook to a unified term of ten years, with four
years fixed. (R., p.52; Tr. 4/13/15, p.23, Ls.14-15.) The judgment was entered on
April 13, 2015. (R., pp.52-53.) After his attorney’s motion to withdraw was granted,
Mr. Cook filed a pro se motion pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”) for
reduction of sentence, which he supported with additional information. (R., pp.54, 5758, 61-66.) Mr. Cook filed a pro se notice of appeal on May 18, 2015. (R., pp.84-88.)
The district court denied Mr. Cook’s Rule 35 motion without a hearing on June 23, 2015.
(R., pp.104-07.)

Mr. Cook filed an amended notice of appeal, through counsel, on

July 8, 2015. (R., pp.110-13.)
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed upon Mr. Cook a
unified sentence of ten years, with four years fixed, in light of the mitigating
factors that exist in this case?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Cook’s Rule 35
motion?
ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Upon Mr. Cook A Unified
Sentence Of Ten Years, With Four Years Fixed, In Light Of The Mitigating Factors That
Exist In This Case
Mr. Cook asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of ten
years, with four years fixed, is excessive. Where, as here, the sentence imposed by the
district court is within statutory limits, “the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating
that it is a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834 (2011) (quoting
State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875 (2011)).

“When a trial court exercises its

discretion in sentencing, ‘the most fundamental requirement is reasonableness.’” Id.
(quoting State v. Hooper, 119 Idaho 606, 608 (1991)). “A sentence is reasonable if it
appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to
achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.” Id.
(citation omitted). “When reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence this Court will
make an independent examination of the record, ‘having regard to the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest.’” Id.
(quoting State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982)).
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The most important factor for the Court to independently examine here is the
nature of the offense. Mr. Cook pled guilty to one count of DUI. At the change of plea
hearing, the district court asked Mr. Cook, “What did you do to make you guilty [of
Count One]?”

(Tr. 2/20/15, p.8, L.3.)

Mr. Cook answered, “Drunk and drive.”

(Tr. 2/2/10, p.8, L.4.) He then admitted to drinking two beers and a shot of whiskey or
rum on the evening in question. (Tr. 2/20/15, p.8, L.5 – p.9, L.3.) His blood alcohol
level was measured at .11. (Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”), pp.34, 42.)
Mr. Cook also admitted this was his second felony DUI within fifteen years, and
the circumstances of his prior DUI are important. In January 2012, Mr. Cook pled guilty
in California to vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. (Tr. 2/20/15, p.9, Ls.10-21;
R., p.23.) He was driving on a two-lane highway on May 8, 2010. (PSI, p.18.) It was a
windy day, and at approximately 9:00 a.m., he crossed over the center line and was
involved in a head-on collision which resulted in a person’s death. (Tr. 4/13/15, p.10,
L.23 – p.11, L.14.) No alcohol was involved, but small amounts of THC and some
amphetamine were found in Mr. Cook’s system. (Tr. 4/13/15, p.12, Ls.1-15.) He told
the presentence investigator that he smoked marijuana and took sinus pills on the night
before the accident. (PSI, p.23.) Mr. Cook suffered brain damage as a result of the
accident and has not used marijuana ever since. (PSI, pp.23, 46.)
In light of the nature of the instant offense and his prior felony offense, the district
court should have imposed a shorter term of imprisonment and allowed Mr. Cook to
complete a rider. Mr. Cook was highly motivated for treatment and sent a letter to the
court in advance of sentencing stating he had “never done a program” and was a
“strong person” who can “fix [his] problems.”
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(PSI, pp.47, 55.)

Mr. Cook had the

support of his father, his father’s girlfriend, and his fiancé. (PSI, p.52.) The GAIN
evaluator recommended intensive outpatient treatment for alcohol dependence. (PSI,
pp.46, 53.) The presentence investigator recommended that the district court retain
jurisdiction and described Mr. Cook as “a good candidate for an order of retained
jurisdiction.” (PSI, p.27.) A shorter term of imprisonment with a period of retained
jurisdiction would have protected the public interest and allowed Mr. Cook to address
his alcohol problem, just as he had previously addressed his marijuana use. The district
court abused its discretion by imposing upon Mr. Cook an excessive sentence.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Cook’s Rule 35 Motion
Mr. Cook asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his
Rule 35 motion in light of the additional information he submitted to the court. “A motion
to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the sound
discretion of the sentencing court and essentially is a plea for leniency which may be
granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe.” State v. Trent, 125
Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994) (citations omitted).

“The denial of a motion for

modification of a sentence will not be disturbed absent a showing that the court abused
its discretion.” Id. “If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced, the defendant
must later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional information presented
with the motion for reduction.” Id.; see also State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203
(2007).
In support of his Rule 35 motion, Mr. Cook admitted (again) that he had been
drinking alcohol and driving on the night in question. (R., p.62.) However, he denied
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that he eluded police and specifically challenged some of the statements set forth in the
police reports which purportedly identified him as the person eluding police. (R., p.62.)
Among other things, Mr. Cook stated that the sweatshirt he was wearing was not
consistent with the police’s description of the sweatshirt worn by the person eluding
police; the officer watched the person eluding police leave the Rodeo Bar, but Mr. Cook
had been drinking at the Sportsman’s Bar; the motorcycle being driven by the person
eluding police did not have a license plate, whereas Mr. Cook’s motorcycle has a
license plate. (R., p.62.) In sum, he explained, “I don’t believe [the officer] had a good
look at the person he claims was me riding that night.” (R., p.62.)
The district court denied Mr. Cook’s Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.104-07.) In its
order, the court stated Mr. Cook did not file any additional information supporting his
motion. (R., p.104.) This is incorrect. The district court had the police reports before it
at sentencing, but Mr. Cook did not specifically challenge these reports at sentencing.
Thus, the statements Mr. Cook made in support of his Rule 35 motion presented new or
additional information to the court.

The court also stated it would not consider

Mr. Cook’s statements in light of his guilty plea. (R., p.106.) The court wrote:
Whether or not there were potential defenses available to
the Defendant, it is well established that “‘[a] valid plea of
guilty, voluntarily and understandingly given, waives all nonjurisdictional defects and defenses, whether constitutional or
statutory, in prior proceedings.’” State v. Al-Kotrani, 141
Idaho 66, 69, 106 P.3d 392, 395 (2005) (quoting Clark v.
State, 92 Idaho 827, 832, 452 P.2d 54, 59 (1969)); State v.
Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 86, 218 P.3d 1143, 1147 (2009).
(R., p.106.) What the court failed to recognize is that Mr. Cook did not plead guilty to
eluding a peace officer; he pled guilty to DUI. Al-Kotrani, Clark and Clements do not
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stand for the proposition that a person’s valid plea of guilty to one crime waives all
defenses that person might have to another crime.
Mr. Cook has never admitted he was driving the motorcycle that was eluding
police, and it is certainly possible someone else was driving that motorcycle. (PSI, pp.
39, 42.)

The person driving the motorcycle ran off on foot, and another officer

apprehended Mr. Cook outside of his garage/shed, which was near where the
motorcycle driver ran off. (PSI, pp.39, 42.) The district court placed extreme emphasis
on the eluding conduct at Mr. Cook’s sentencing. It described the offense for which it
was imposing sentence as follows:
Now here’s what we have in this particular case: We have
you hanging out at a bar, revving your engine, doing
something that I can perceive like Evel Knievel on your
motorcycle, with your front wheel up in the air jumping a curb
leaving the parking lot. And then we have a high speed
chase through a community where you almost hit somebody,
you pull into your house, you get off your motorcycle, and
then you try to run from the cops. Now that in and of itself is
dangerous, and we couple with that the fact that you were
under the influence of alcohol when that occurred.
(Tr. 4/13/15, p.19, L.15 – p.20, L.20.) The court continued, “You almost—or could have
killed somebody this most recent time as you’re hotrodding through the neighborhood
on your motorcycle, because you clearly don’t want to be arrested for driving under the
influence.” (Tr. 4/13/15, p.22, Ls.1-5.) The court determined that Mr. Cook was “a
danger to the community” who “put everybody else at risk” and was engaged in
“particularly egregious” behavior.

(Tr. 4/13/15, p.22, L.24 – p.23, L.1.)

These

statements clearly did not relate to Mr. Cook’s offense of driving while intoxicated with a
BAC of .11, which was the count to which he pled guilty.
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A sentencing court can, of course, consider allegations of criminal conduct at
sentencing. See State v. Paz, 112 Idaho 407, 409 (Ct. App. 1987). However, it must
exercise “due caution” in doing so. State v. Barnes, 121 Idaho 409, 411 (Ct. App.
1992). The district court did not exercise due caution in considering the eluding conduct
at Mr. Cook’s sentencing, which Mr. Cook attempted to point out (without the benefit of
counsel) in his Rule 35 motion. Where, as here, a district court sentences a defendant
for an offense that is not before the court, and considers the existence of alleged
criminal activity without due caution, the proper remedy is for this Court to vacate the
sentence and remand for resentencing. See, e.g., State v. Findeisen, 133 Idaho 228,
229 (Ct. App. 1999) (vacating and remanding for resentencing where “the district court
went beyond [its] authority and essentially imposed sentence for offenses other than the
one that was before the court”).
CONCLUSION
Mr. Cook respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his sentence be vacated and the case be
remanded to the district court for resentencing.
DATED this 3rd day of December, 2015.

___________/s/______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 3rd day of December, 2015, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy
thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
JEREMY COOK
INMATE #53888
SAWC
125 NORTH 8TH WEST
ST ANTHONY ID 83445
JEFFERY E NONA
ATTORNEY AT LAW
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
E-MAILED BRIEF

__________/s/_______________
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
AWR/eas
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